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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 900484-CA 
v. t 
GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ, 
: Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the trial court's order granting 
defendants' motion to suppress evidence. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Do the trial court's findings of fact meet the 
requirement of detailed findings of fact set forth in State v. 
Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 770-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)? 
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction 
of error" standard of review applies. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 
120 (1990); Provo City Corporation v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 456 
(Utah 1989). 
2. Is the trial court's finding that "[t]here was no 
1 
testimony that Mr. Lopez had ever represented himself to Officer 
Hamner as being named or going by the name of Jose Cruz," clearly 
erroneous? 
The factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling 
on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
they are clearly erroneous. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987). 
3. Did the trial court apply the pertinent legal 
standard in concluding that the stop of defendant was pretextual? 
In assessing the trial court's legal conclusions based 
on its factual findings, the appellate court applies a 
"correction of error" standard of review. State v. Palmer, 803 
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
4. Should this Court retain the pretext stop analysis 
adopted in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-79 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990)? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Gerard Cotero J. Lopez, was charged with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1990) (R. 6-7). 
2 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine found 
by a police officer in defendant's car (R. 19-20). After a 
suppression hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion 
(R. 27-31). The State filed a petition for permission to appeal 
pursuant to rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(e) (Supp. 1990) (R. 34-53). This Court 
granted the petition (R. 67). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The sole witness at the suppression hearing was Officer 
Hamner, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department (SH. 
6). He testified to the following pertinent facts. 
On June 6, 1990, Officer Hamner saw defendant traveling 
southbound on 400 East in Salt Lake City in a vehicle the officer 
recognized as one he had seen on a number of occasions in the 
vicinity of two local bars which were known for criminal activity 
ranging from robberies to illegal drug use. Hamner recognized 
defendant from the officer's days as an undercover officer 
approximately nine months earlier. Others had pointed out 
defendant out as a drug dealer and had identified him as Jose 
Cruz to Hamner. Defendant had introduced himself as Jose Cruz to 
Hamner, and Hamner believed that that was his name. Furthermore, 
Hamner knew of "Jose Cruz" through his work with the Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force, having been shown a picture of Cruz (SH. 
6-9, 18, 20, 23-24). 
Upon seeing defendant, Hamner, believing that 
defendant's name was Jose Cruz, followed defendant and 
3 
immediately checked whether he had a driver's license. Hamner 
made this check because when he knew defendant nine months 
earlier, defendant did not have a license. Having determined 
that there was no record of a driver's license for a Jose Cruz, 
Hamner observed defendant make a turn without signaling. Hamner 
then pulled over defendant and asked him for a driver's license. 
Defendant was unable to produce a license but did produce an 
identification card that indicated he was "Geraldo Lopez." 
Hamner ran a warrants check on Geraldo Lopez, discovered that 
there were three outstanding warrants on him, and placed 
defendant under arrest. Defendant was subsequently cited for 
driving without a driver's license and the failure to signal 
before making a turn1. Hamner impounded defendant's vehicle, 
and during an inventory search of it, he and another officer 
found several bags of a white powder which field-tested positive 
for cocaine (SH. 10, 12-15). Hamner testified that, although he 
suspected defendant of having something to do with drugs, he 
stopped defendant for driving without a license and the illegal 
turn (SH. 20-21). 
In considering defendant's motion to suppress, the 
trial court found the following facts: 
1. Mr. Lopez was pointed out to Officer 
Hamner by someone else on a previous occasion 
and that he was pointed out as Jose Cruz, a 
dealer in drugs; 
1
 Officer Hamner testified that he writes citations for 
failure to signal about seven times a month, and that he always 
stops an individual suspected of driving without a driver's 
license unless he is "en route to a very high pariority call" (SH. 
11). 
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2. Officer Hamner relied on erroneous 
information and stopped who he thought was 
Jose Cruz in order to search for drugs. 
3. Based on the wrong name Officer Hamner 
also did a Driver's License check and found 
there was no license issued to Jose Cruz; 
4. There was no testimony that Mr. Lopez had 
ever represented himself to Officer Hamner as 
being named or going by the name of Jose 
Cruz, nor had he ever stopped defendant 
before; 
5. At about the same time Officer Hamner 
observed defendant make a left turn and says 
he did not see a signal at which time a stop 
was made; 
6. The (underlying motivation for the stop 
was to search for drugsTJand all conclusions 
as to the identity of TIr. Lopez as Jose Cruz 
were erroneous. 
(R. 27-28). 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court 
suppressed the evidence, stating the following conclusions of 
law: 
/l. The underlying motivation to follow and 
S^to stop the [sic] search for drugs; 
2. The stop was a "pretext stop" the [sic] 
subsequent search of the car and seizure of 
the contraband also violated Mr. Lopez's 
state and federal constitutional rights 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
3. The contraband seized from the car may 
not be presented in evidence against Mr. 
Lopez, and his motion to suppress this 
evidence is hereby granted. 
(R. 28-29). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In suppressing the evidence seized from the car 
defendant was driving, the trial court adopted findings of fact 
7 
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drafted by defendant's counsel. Those findings are very brief 
and do not set out the circumstances of Officer Hamner's contact 
with defendant prior to the investigatory stop at issue here, or 
the totality of the circumstances of the stop of defendant's 
car. Without specific findings of fact on those points, this 
Court cannot properly review the trial court's legal conclusion 
that the stop of defendant was pretextual. Nor can the parties 
be adequately informed of the facts that underpin the lower 
court's legal conclusion. In short, the findings of fact in this 
case do not meet the requirements of State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 
767, 770-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In light of Officer Hamner's testimony that defendant 
had prevously introduced himself to Hamner as Jose Cruz, the 
trial court's finding that "[t]here was no testimony that Mr. 
Lopez had ever represented himself to Officer Hamner as being 
named or going by the name of Jose Cruz," is clearly erroneous. 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (the factual 
findings underlying the trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous). 
In arriving at its conclusion that Officer Hamner's 
stop of defendant was pretextual, the trial court did not cite 
the standard for that determination or indicate how that standard 
was met in this case. See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Indeed, when the Sierra standard is 
applied, the court's finding of pretext appears to be incorrect, 
-6-
in that defendant failed to demonstrate that the hypothetical 
reasonable officer would not have stopped a driver for failing to 
signal before making a turn or for driving without a driver's 
license. See State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Finally, this Court should abandon the pretext stop 
analysis adopted in Sierra and simply require an analysis of the 
legality of the stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See, e.g., United 
States v. Triaas, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
INADEQUATE UNDER STATE V. LOVEGREN, 798 P.2D 
767 (UTAH CT. APP. 1990). 
In suppressing the evidence seized from the car 
defendant was driving, the trial court adopted findings of fact 
drafted by defendant's counsel. Those findings are very brief 
and do not set out the circumstances of Officer Hamner's contact 
with defendant prior to the investigatory stop at issue here, or 
the totality of the circumstances of the stop of defendant's car. 
Nor are there any findings as to usual police practices 
concerning the offenses of driving without a driver's license and 
failing to signal before turning. Without specific and detailed 
findings of fact on these points, this Court cannot properly 
review the trial court's legal conclusion that the stop of 
defendant was pretextual. Nor can the parties be adequately 
informed of the facts that underpin the court's legal conclusion. 
In short, the trial court's findings of fact are inadequate under 
-7-
State v, Loveqren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
 f which 
requires the trial court to prepare detailed findings of fact for 
suppression rulings, so that this Court can "meaningfully review 
the issues on appeal." 798 P.2d at 770. "[T]he findings of fact 
must reveal how the [trial] court resolved each material issue." 
Id. at 771 (quoting Acton v Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987)). Accordingly, this case should be remanded for entry of 
adequate findings of fact. Ibid. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT HAD EVER REPRESENTED 
HIMSELF TO OFFICER HAMNER AS BEING JOSE CRUZ 
IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court found that "[t]here was no testimony 
that Mr. Lopez had ever represented himself to Officer Hamner as 
being or going by the name of Jose Cruz" (R. 28). However, in 
light of Officer Hamner's testimony that defendant had previously 
introduced himself to Hamner as Jose Cruz (SH. 23), that finding 
is clearly erroneous. See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987) (the factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless they 
are clearly erroneous); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) ("A finding is clearly erroneous if 'it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made.'" (citations omitted)). 
Although some confusion on this point may have been 
-8-
created in cross-examination of Hamner2, it is clear from the 
record that Hamner testified that defendant introduced himself to 
the officer as Jose Cruz. Indeed, the trial court explicity 
recognized this in discussing a point in closing argument with 
the prosecutor: 
[T]he officer testified that he suspected 
Mr. Lopez of dealing drugs when he was 
undercover, and . . . had been introduced to 
Mr. Lopez as Mr. Cruz. . . . The officer 
testified Mr. Lopez identified himself as Mr. 
Cruz. 
(SH. 28-29). 
2
 The following exchange occurred between defense counsel 
and Officer Hamner: 
[Defense counsel]: He introduced himself 
personally to you? Because you indicated 
that somebody pointed him out to you. 
[Officer Hamner]: At the Annex Bar when I 
was doing my routine patrol a week prior. He 
was pointed out. 
Q. He was pointed out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they told you that's Jose Cruz? 
A. Yes. 
[Defense counsel]: Okay. 
[Officer Hamner]: Or I had known his name 
from previous. 
[The prosecutor]: I'm not sure if the 
witness understood the question, did you? 
Prior to that week had you ever personally 
met the defendant? 
[Officer Hamner]: Yes, I did. In the Annex 
Bar. 
(SH. 24). 
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Accordingly, in remanding the case for more detailed 
findings, this Court should direct the trial court that its 
finding that there was no testimony that defendant had ever 
represented himself as Jose Cruz to Hamner, is clearly erroneous, 
POINT III 
IN CONCLUDING THAT A PRETEXT STOP HAD 
OCCURRED, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE 
PERTINENT LAW. 
In arriving at its conclusion that Officer Hamner's 
stop of defendant was pretextual, the trial court did not cite 
the standard for that determination or indicate how that standard 
was met in this case. See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 97 2 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990). 
In Sierra, this Court set forth the following standard 
for determining whether a pretext stop has occurred: 
[I]f a hypothetical reasonable police officer 
would not have stopped the driver for the 
cited offense, and the surrounding 
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, 
the stop is unconstitutional. 
754 P.2d at 979. The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable 
officer would have made a stop under the circumstances, not 
whether the officer could have made a stop. JId. at 978. The 
test is an objective one. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; United 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988). The 
trial court neither mentioned nor applied this standard in ruling 
that the stop was a pretext (R. 27-29). In fact, defendant 
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failed to mention or analyze the Sierra standard in arguing that 
a pretext stop had occurred (SH. 29-30). 
Therefore, in remanding the case for more detailed 
findings, this Court should direct the trial court to apply the 
Sierra standard in determining whether a pretext stop occurred.3 
Given the undisputed testimony of the officer that he routinely 
stops and cites for driving without a license and failing to 
signal before making a turn (SH. 11), there appears to be no 
basis for concluding that the stop was pretextual. See State v. 
Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10 (based upon record evidence, stop 
for following too closely not pretextual); State v. Smith, 781 
P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stop for failing to signal 
before making a turn not pretextual, as "this is the type of 
clear cut traffic violation for which officers routinely stop 
citizens and issue citations"). 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT SHOULD ABANDON THE PRETEXT STOP 
ANALYSIS ADOPTED IN SIERRA AND SIMPLY ANALYZE 
THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP UNDER THE 
TRADITIONAL DELAWARE V. PROUSE TEST. 
The Sierra Court adopted the pretext analysis followed 
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. 
Smith, 799 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1986). However, it did so without 
discussing a contrary view that has been followed by a number of 
other federal circuits and some state courts. This alternative 
view, which represents a more direct and easily applied approach 
3
 The Court should direct the lower court to apply the 
Sierra standard only if it does not adopt the legal principle 
argued for by the State in Point IV of this brief. 
-11-. 
to the question of whether a vehicle stop is constitutional, 
should replace the Sierra analysis. 
The "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard adopted 
in Sierra is difficult to apply. This is evident from several of 
this Court's decisions. For example, in Sierra itself, the Court 
purported to apply a pretext analysis—which "occurs when the 
police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to 
search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an 
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to support a stop," United States v. Guzman, 
864 F.2d at 1515—but actually applied the investigatory stop 
test set forth in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Under 
Prouse, to lawfully stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes, an 
officer must have a reasonable suspicion or probable cause that 
either the vehicle or an occupant has violated or is about to 
violate the law (i.e., a traffic or equipment regulation, or any 
applicable criminal law). j[d. at 661, 663. See also State v. 
Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 
(1983); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Sierra Court's conclusion that a reasonable officer would not 
have stopped the defendant's car, 754 P.2d at 979, was based on 
it being "unable to assess whether [the defendant] even violated 
Utah's left-lane provisions," ibid. At bottom, in finding the 
stop to be pretextual, the Court did not assume the technical 
validity of the initial stop under the Prouse standard, as it 
would have to under the pretext analysis set forth in United 
States v. Smith and Guzman, and then proceed to the question of 
-12-
whether the "hypothetical reasonable officer" would have made 
this technically lawful stop under the circumstances. It 
actually found an absence of reasonable suspicion to justify the 
stop, a violation of Prouse. 
An additional problem with Sierra is that although the 
Court stated that the pretext standard is an objective standard, 
it nevertheless fully considered the officer's subjective mental 
state in determining that a pretext stop had occurred. See 754 
P.2d at 979-80. This same problem of subjective elements finding 
their way into a purportedly objective test appears in subsequent 
decisions of this Court where pretext and Sierra are discussed. 
See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, P.2d (Utah 1990); State v. Arroyo, 770 
P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reversed on other grounds, 
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
Finally, it is not clear from this Court's pretext 
cases what evidence is necessary to establish what the 
"hypothetical reasonable officer" would have done under certain 
circumstances and which party must shoulder the burden of proof 
on the pretext question. Compare Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155 (stop 
for "following too closely" pretextual), with State v. Lovegren, 
798 P.2d at 771 n.10 (stop for "following too closely" not 
pretextual). 
Given these problems with the Sierra pretext analysis, 
this Court should abandon that standard in favor of the 
traditional reasonable suspicion/probable cause standard for 
assessing the validity of a particular seizure. As noted 
-13-
earlier, a number of federal and state courts have rejected the 
Sierra pretext analysis, limiting the inquiry to whether the 
police had either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 
justify the seizure (i.e., a stop or an arrest). See, e.g., 
United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990) (specifically 
rejecting the pretext test adopted in United States v. Smith and 
United States v. Guzman): State v. Olaiz, 100 Or.App. 380f 786 
P.2d 734 (Or. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or. 1990). The 
inquiry does not go beyond that point to ask whether the officer 
normally would have effected the seizure under the circumstances. 
Ibid. "'[S]o long as the the police are doing no more than they 
are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, [the 
resulting stop or] arrest is constitutional. 'fl Cummins, 920 F.2d 
at 501 (quoting United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (relying upon United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 
1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (M[TJhe Court has told us that where police 
officers are objectively doing what they are legally authorized 
to do . . . the results of their investigations are not to be 
called in question on the basis of any subjective intent with 
which they acted.")). 
This approach is most consistent with the well settled 
principle that "the fact that the officer does not have the state 
of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the 
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate 
the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, justify that action." Scott v. United States, 436 
-14-
U.S. 128, 138 (1978). "The Court's language leaves little doubt 
that 'the officer's actual state of mind at the time of the 
challenged action was taken[]' is of no significance in 
determining whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has 
occurred." Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501 (quoting Maryland v. Macon. 
472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)) (footnote omitted). Furthermore, 
the "usual police practices" approach, which is inherent in the 
Sierra pretext analysis, see Loveqren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10, is a 
far reaching check on the discretion of individual police 
officers which is not firmly grounded in the Supreme Court's 
fourth amendment jurisprudence. "The Court . . . has never 
indicated that the discretionary exercise of the arrest [or 
detention] power, a power that is contingent upon a prior 
determination of probable cause [or reasonable suspicion], is 
constitutionally significant." Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041. 
In sum, this Court should abandon the Sierra standard 
in favor of the approach followed in Trigg and numerous other 
courts, and should direct the trial court on remand to consider 
only whether the stop of defendant was lawful under Delaware v. 
Prouse. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's suppression order and remand the case 
for the entry of adequate findings of fact and a ruling only on 
whether the vehicle stop was lawful under Delaware v. Prouse. 
Alternatively, the Court should direct the trial court 
to consider whether the stop of defendant was pretextual under 
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the standard set forth in State v. Sierra, 
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